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41 Introduction
Whenever we have different options we must choose. Whatever decision we take it will
affect the future. A decision criterion that gives at least some weight to the future must
compare the states of affairs at different points in time. There are many problems
involved. We cannot predict with certainty what the future states of affairs will be. We
are confronted with different values – like welfare and freedom – and we do not know
how to make them commensurable. Different individuals will be affected and we do not
know how to compare their welfare or their freedom. This paper deals with just one
problem: comparison of values across time.
To keep the analysis simple, let us assume that welfare is the only value that matters
and that all welfare is derived from consumption. Every option or course of action –
 called a project in the following – generates a consumption path for each individual.
The social decision problem is the selection of a best project when several projects are
feasible. To facilitate this selection economists have developed cost-benefit analysis. To
evaluate a project one must count all the costs and all the benefits of the project at each
point in time. The standard procedure to make comparisons of costs and benefits across
time is the discounting method. This method converts all value into present value. The
benefits and costs at some point in time t = 0, 1, 2, ... are evaluated from the perspective
of the present (the time of decision making) by giving them a weight 1/(1 + ρ)t; ρ is
called the social discount rate. The value of a project from the perspective of the present
is the sum of all weighted net benefits (benefits minus cost) of the project over time.
From a sample of projects the project with the highest value is the socially preferred
one.
Of course, for project selection the choice of the social discount rate is crucial; the
larger it is the less weight is given to the future. With a positive rate benefits and costs
count the less the later they occur. A zero rate gives equal weight to benefits and costs
regardless of their time of occurrence. If the social discount rate is negative, future
benefits and costs are more important compared to present ones. The debate about the
5choice of an appropriate discount rate has been with us for more than a century. Böhm-
Bawerk (1889), Ramsey (1928), Fisher (1930), Marglin (1963), Olson and Bailey
(1981), Lind (1982), Broome (1992), Arrow et al. (1996), Weitzman (2001) and others
have contributed to this debate, but the issue has not been settled.
It is shown in this paper that a debate about the proper social discount rate, whether it
should be high or low, cannot have an answer, if the Pareto principle and a condition of
consumer sovereignty are adopted. According to the Pareto principle a project should
not be chosen, if there is another project that is (weakly) preferred by everyone and
strictly preferred by someone. Consumer sovereignty means that individuals may differ
in their individual time preference for consumption. It is shown that for some sample of
projects the discounting method would select a project which violates the Pareto
principle for every conceivable social discount rate.2 The next section gives a concise
formal account of the discounting method for intertemporal social choice. Section 3
proves the main result that there is no social discount rate which is compatible with the
Pareto principle and a condition of consumer sovereignty. Discussion and conclusions
follow.
2 The discounting method for intertemporal social
choice
We consider an intertemporal social choice problem of society N. Individual members
of society are denoted i, j ∈ N. The problem is to select a project x out of a set of
feasible projects X. Formally, in a model of discrete time, a project is a course of action
that generates a consumption path for each individual.3 Denote individual i's
consumption at time t = 0, 1, 2, ... generated by project x as cit(x). Hence, the
consumption path of individual i generated by project x is a (finite or infinite) sequence
ci(x) = 〈ci0(x), ..., cit(x), ...〉. Then, each project corresponds to a profile of consumption
                                                
2 This research was inspired by Broome's (1989) work.
3 Whether individuals have a finite or infinite lifetime, whether population is stable or changes over time,
and whether the number of members of society is finite or infinite does not affect the argument.
6paths [c1(x), ..., ci(x), ...]. We denote the total consumption at time t under project x as
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The discounting method evaluates the path of total consumption generated by each
project x as a weighted sum of consumption over time, the net present value of a
project. The weight factor of consumption at time t is λ(t). In the standard discounting
procedure, called exponential discounting, it is assumed that λ(t) = (1 + ρ)–t, where the
social discount rate ρ > –1 is time-invariant. The net present value of project x is:
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Competing projects are ranked according to their net present values. The discounting
method can be characterised in the following way:
DISCOUNTING WITH A SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE   Project x is (strictly) socially
preferred to project y, if and only if
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Note that Strotz (1955) has shown that exponential discounting is the only way to
obtain time-consistent decisions.
3 The incompatibility of a social discount rate and the
Pareto principle.
Each individual evaluates her own consumption path as a weighted sum of consumption
over time. Individual i's weight factor of consumption at time t is λi(t). The total value
of consumption from project x for individual i is 
0
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We adopt the following axioms:
7CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY   For all individuals i ∈ N and all times t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the
weight individual i attaches to consumption at time t should be positive and less
than infinity; 0 < λi(t) < ∞. Otherwise there are no restrictions on λi(t).
PARETO PRINCIPLE   For any two feasible projects x, y ∈ X, if for all individuals
i ∈ N  Vi(x) ≥ Vi(y) and for some individual j ∈ N  Vj(x) > Vj(y), then y should never
be chosen. We will say that y is a Pareto dominated project.
We can now prove the main result of the paper.
THEOREM   Discounting with a social discount rate is incompatible with the Pareto
principle and consumer sovereignty.
Proof: The proof is by construction of an example where discounting with a social
discount rate selects a Pareto dominated project. Let us assume N = {1, 2}. By
consumer sovereignty we assume λ1(t) = (1 + l)–t and λ2(t) = (1 + h)–t with 0 < l < h,
which means that person 1 has a low rate of time preference and person 2 has a high
rate of time preference.
Consider the following individual consumption paths of length T:
a = 〈1, ..., 1〉, i.e. cit(x) = 1 for t = 0, ..., T – 1 and cit(x) = 0 for all t ≥ T;
b = 〈0, ..., 0, 2T〉, i.e. ciT–1(x) = 2T and cit(x) = 0 at all times other than T – 1.
Furthermore, let the consumption profiles of a sample of projects w, y, z be
[c1(w), c2(w)] = [b, a],
[c1(y), c2(y)] = [a, a],
[c1(z), c2(z)] = [b, b].
We show that the discounting method may select a Pareto dominated project. First
notice that for a low social discount rate project z is preferred to w and y. z gives a
higher total consumption, although at a later time. For a high social discount rate project
y is preferred to w and z, because late consumption on path b is given little weight; cf.
figure 1. In the special case where ρ = r (see figure 1) NPV(w) = NPV(y) = NPV(z). This
also allows for the choice of y or z. However, for a pair of individual rates of time
preference, l, h, such that l > r> h  w Pareto dominates y and z. Therefore, y and z should
8never be chosen. Hence, the discounting method violates the Pareto principle for every
conceivable social discount rate.?
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Figure 1: Value as a function of the discount rate
4 Discussion
The preceding section proves that the discounting method may violate the Pareto
principle once individuals differ in their rate of time preference for consumption. What
to conclude from this result? We must either question the axioms or reject the
discounting method. The Pareto principle, while under discussion in other contexts,
such as Sen's (1970) paradox of the Paretian Liberal, can be defended here. As we
consider only the value of consumption, Pareto efficiency is a mild requirement. Very
few economists would reject it in the case at hand.
Consumer sovereignty is more demanding, particularly in intertemporal choice
problems. Individuals may have defective telescopic faculties, as Pigou (1920, 24-26)
has argued. Hence, one can argue that they should not evaluate their own future, but
rather each individual's consumption path should be evaluated using the same discount
9rate. If the same time preference for consumption applies to all individuals, then the
axiom of consumer sovereignty has no grip. Although consumer sovereignty may be
rejected on such grounds as Pigou's, still there are good reasons to believe that time
preference for consumption may differ between individuals. From a utilitarian
perspective, for example, it is well possible that a well-nourished person should wait for
a bigger meal, while a person close to starvation should eat sooner even at the cost of
getting less.
A second objection against the axiom of consumer sovereignty says that the market
equalises consumption discount rates. If consumers do not face any saving or borrowing
constraints, they will be able to transfer current consumption into future consumption or
vice versa at an equilibrium rate of interest. A rational consumer will then adopt a
consumption pattern such that her marginal rate of substitution between current and
future consumption is equal to the interest rate. Hence, all consumers discount future
consumption at the same rate and the axiom consumer sovereignty loses its relevance.4
While this objection is correct, it relies on rather strong assumptions about the
functioning of capital markets. Under such stronger assumptions discounting with the
market interest rate as social discount rate will select Pareto efficient projects (Mas-
Colell et al. 1995). 
5 Conclusion
The discounting method is inconsistent with the Pareto principle and consumer
sovereignty. Objections against the Pareto principle – discussed in the social choice
literature – are not relevant for our case of intertemporal decision-making. Furthermore,
it can be argued that individuals should be free in their valuation of consumption now
and later. This principle of consumer sovereignty is a relevant condition whenever
intertemporal transfers are restricted or different individuals face different interest rates.
This, of course, is the case in economies with information imperfections and missing
markets. The conclusion is straightforward. The discounting method must be rejected as
                                                
4 I owe this objection to Reyer Gerlagh.
10
a general method to select public projects. Instead, we might consider alternative social
decision mechanisms, such as voting. However, voting mechanisms face the problem of
Arrow's (1950) impossibility result. 
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